Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against  Non-Persons  for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Bodensteiner, Ivan E.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Symposium on Federal Jurisdiction 
and Procedure 
pp.215-236 
Symposium on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 
Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" for 
Deprivation of Constitutional Rights 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" for Deprivation of 
Constitutional Rights, 8 Val. U. L. Rev. 215 (1974). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/2 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at 
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, 
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at 
scholar@valpo.edu. 
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION OF SUITS
AGAINST "NON-PERSONS" FOR
DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
IVAN E. BODENSTEINER*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1973 term the United States Supreme Court decided
two cases restricting the scope of the term "person" as used in 42
U.S.C. § 1983.' In Moor v. County of Alameda' the plaintiffs
brought an action for damages only3 against the County of Alameda,
the sheriff and several deputies, claiming they were injured by the
defendants during a disturbance at People's Park. Plaintiffs at-
tempted to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988.' The Court, however, relying on Monroe v. Pape,5 concluded
that § 1983 was "unavailable to these petitioners insofar as they
seek to sue the County."' Since Moor was an action for damages
only, not equitable relief, the decision was not an extension of
Monroe except to make it clear that a county should be treated the
same as a municipality for § 1983 purposes. A month later, in City
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Aid Clinic, Valparaiso University
School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
2. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
3. Id. at 695 n.2.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district courts by [the Civil
Rights Actsl . . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies ... , the common law, as modi-
fied and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsist-
ent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . ..
5. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. 411 U.S. at 710.
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of Kenosha v. Bruno,7 the Court had to face the question it had
avoided in Monroe and Moor, i.e., whether a municipality is a "per-
son" within the meaning of § 1983 for purposes of equitable relief.
The plaintiffs in Bruno brought civil rights actions for declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the cities of Racine and Kenosha,
Wisconsin, alleging they had been denied liquor licenses by the
cities in violation of the fourteenth amendment procedural due pro-
cess provisions. A three-judge district court,' relying on two Seventh
Circuit cases holding that Monroe was limited to actions for dam-
ages,' granted equitable relief. In reversing the district court, the
Supreme Court stated:
Since, as the Court held in Monroe, "Congress did not un-
dertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit
of' § 1983, id., at 187, they are outside of its ambit for
purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages. The
District Court was therefore wrong in concluding it had
jurisdiction of appellees' complaints under § 1343."
After holding that "the District Court was therefore wrong in con-
cluding it had jurisdiction of appellee's complaints under § 1343,""1
the Court remanded the case for the district court to consider the
"availability of § 1331 jurisdiction."' 2 Justice Brennan, in a concur-
ring opinion, stated:
[Slince the defendants named in the complaints were the
municipalities of Kenosha and Racine, jurisdiction cannot
7. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
8. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
9. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v. City of Park
Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
10. 412 U.S. at 513.
11. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. ...
12. 412 U.S. at 514. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
[Vol. 8
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be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) .... If appellees can prove their allegation that at
least $10,000 is in controversy, then § 1331 jurisdiction is
available, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); cf. Bivens v.
Six Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and they
are clearly entitled to relief.'3
Assuming for purposes of this article that the Court was correct
in its holdings in Moor and Bruno that counties'4 and municipalities
are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 for purposes of
either equitable relief or damages, it would appear that plaintiffs
can still obtain both types of relief against counties and municipali-
ties by stating a cause of action directly under the United States
Constitution rather than § 1983. Bruno certainly supports this in its
holding that the plaintiffs can obtain relief if the jurisdictional
amount requirement of § 1331 is met. Indeed Justice Brennan, in
concurring, cites Bell v. Hood'" and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics'" after asserting that
§ 1331 jurisdiction is available if there is $10,000 in controversy,"
thereby clearly implying that a cause of action exists under the
fourteenth amendment.
In view of the clear language of § 1343(3), the disturbing aspect
of' Bruno is the Court's conclusion that since the plaintiffs could not
state a cause of action under § 1983, jurisdiction could not be based
on § 1343. This is found in both the majority' 8 and concurring"'
opinions but neither offers any explanation as to why jurisdiction
cannot be based on § 1343. This conclusion, it is submitted, is
erroneous since § 1343(3) expressly provides jurisdiction "to redress
the deprivation, . . .of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States.... 20
As discussed below, plaintiffs can, therefore, obtain both equi-
13. 412 U.S. at 516.
14. Even though Bruno concerned only a municipality, in light of Moor it is quite
apparent that the result would be the same in a suit against a county.
15. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. 412 U.S. at 516.
18. Id. at 513.
19. Id. at 516.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (emphasis added).
19741
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table relief and damages from counties and municipalities,2 ' if they
have a constitutional claim, by stating a cause of action directly
under the Constitution and alleging jurisdiction under § 1343(3),
and § 1331(a) where the jurisdictional amount is met. The fact that
there may be jurisdiction under both § 1343(3) and § 1331(a) is not
unusual and entirely consistent with the holding in Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corp.,'22 where the Court concluded that § 1343 cov-
ered actions to secure property as well as personal rights even
though § 1331 would often be available when property rights were
at issue. In the following sections this approach will be examined
by. looking separately at three factors: stating a claim under the
Constitution, jurisdiction under § 1331(a) and jurisdiction under
§ 1343(3). The purpose of this article is not to attempt an exhaus-
tive analysis of any of these three factors, but rather to demonstrate
that Moor and Bruno do not insulate counties and municipalities
from suits for deprivation of constitutional rights and that Bruno is
wrong in its suggestion that jurisdiction cannot be based on
§ 1343(3) when a cause of action is not stated under § 1983.
STATING A CAUSE OF ACTION DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Any discussion of this topic must begin with Bell v. Hood2a
which was a suit against agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion seeking damages for violations of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments because of alleged unconstitutional arrests, searches and sei-
zures. The Supreme Court, while holding that a federal district
court has jurisdiction under § 1331 of a claim for damages against
federal officers for violation of constitutional rights, "reserved the
question whether violation of that command by a federal agent
acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for
21. Counties and municipalities are also subject to equitable relief and damages in
actions hrouight pirquant to 42 IJ.S.C_ §§ 1981 and 19A2. Set.inn 1P82 wnuld clparly envpr
actions challenging racial discrimination in housing, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), and § 1981 would cover actions challenging racial discrimination in employment,
Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private
Employment, 7 HAR. Civ. RIGHs-Civ. Lia. L. REv. 56 (1972), by either a county or city. See
also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In such actions jurisdiction
would definitely be conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4). Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S
at 412. Since the requisite state action would be present in a suit against a county or city,
there is no reason to believe jurisdiction would not also be available under § 1343(3).
22. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
23. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
[Vol. 8
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damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct." 4 In Bell
v. Hood the Court was able to avoid the "cause of action" problem
because the district court had dismissed for want of federal jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the case did not arise under the Constitution
or laws of the United States.15 The Supreme Court held that the
district court had jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of ac-
tion had been stated" and remanded the case to the district court
to make that determination. 27 Several years later the "cause of ac-
tion" issue was again avoided by the Supreme Court in Wheeldin
v. Wheeler ' on the ground that the plaintiff, who claimed a viola-
tion of fourth amendment rights caused by the service of a subpoena
to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee,2
did not allege facts constituting a violation of the fourth amend-
ment.3'
Finally, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics:" the Court was squarely confronted with
the question of whether or not a plaintiff could state a cause of
action directly under the Constitution.32 The answer to this question
is relevant to at least two very important areas of litigation. The
first involves suits against federal officials who violate rights secured
by the United States Constitution. Since, as Justice Black pointed
out in his dissent in Bivens,3 Congress has not passed anything
comparable to § 1983 applicable to federal officials, there is no
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 389 (1971).
25. Bell v. Hood, __ F. Supp. - (S.D. Cal.), aff'd 150 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945).
26. 327 U.S. at 682.
27. On remand the district court took jurisdiction and "[being of the opinion that
neither the Constitution nor the statutes of the United States give rise to any cause of action
in favor of plaintiffs upon the facts alleged," granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820-21 (S.D. Cal.
1947).
28. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
29. Plaintiff claimed abuse of process alleging that the defendant federal officer had no
authority to issue the subpoena and that the mere service of the subpoena cost him his job.
373 U.S. at 648.
30. Id. at 649-50.
31. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
32. Another way of framing the question is whether a remedy for violation of a federal
right can be "created" or "implied" when the Constitution or statute establishing the federal
right does not explicitly establish a remedy. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33. 403 U.S. at 427.
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remedy available in the federal courts unless it is possible to state
a cause of action under the Constitution. 4 The second important
area involves suits for violations of constitutional rights against ent-
ities, such as counties and municipalities, which the Supreme Court
has held are not "persons" under § 1983.11 Again, if § 1983 is not
available, there is no remedy available in the federal courts unless
it is possible to state a cause of action under the Constitution."
Suits falling into this category would include police-brutality ac-
tions,37 actions challenging the sufficiency of a county public-
defender system, 3 suits challenging a license denial,"0 suits alleging
racial discrimination in police-hiring practices ° and various other
types of cases." Even though individual county and municipal offi-
cials can still be sued under § 1983, it is desirable to name the
county or municipality as a defendant, particularly where the plain-
tiff seeks damages.
In Bivens the plaintiff sued several agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics claiming they had violated his fourth amendment
rights in the process of making an arrest at his home. The district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under § 1331 and alternatively for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.4" On appeal the Second Circuit held
that under Bell v. Hood "it is clear that the district court had
jurisdiction under § 1331 to determine whether this complaint,
34. The "cause of action" problem should not be confused with jurisdiction; Bell v.
Hood clearly held that jurisdiction of such suits is available under § 1331(a) if the jurisdic-
tional amount is met.
35. See Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507 (1973).
36. As we will see below, jurisdiction over this second type of suit is available under
both § 1331(a) (if the jurisdictional amount is met) and § 1343(3).
37. lRyi v. New Caibe cuuulty, 365 F. Supp. 124 (D. Dei. i973); Boyd v. Adams, Jb4
F. Supp. 1180 (N.D. Il1. 1973); Washington v. Brantley, 352 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
38. Noe v. County of Lake, Civil No. 73 H 157 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 1, 1973).
39. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
40. Smith v. City of Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
41. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (action to enjoin
further clearance of residential property in city); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932
(D. Minn. 1973) (action to compel municipal hospital to provide facilities for abortions);
Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (action alleging violation of
civil rights in mental commitment proceeding).
42. 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
[Vol. 8
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unambiguously founded upon the Fourth Amendment, states a good
federal cause of action, '"4: but agreed that the complaint was pro-
perly dismissed for failure to state a claim. 4 Jurisdiction in Bivens
was asserted under § 1331(a)." In reversing the dismissal for failure
to state a cause of action, the Supreme Court stated:
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demon-
strate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to re-
dress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts. Cf. JI. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury."
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a
cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, supra, pp.
390-395, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the
agents' violation of the Amendment.5
Bivens, then, clearly establishes that a cause of action can be
stated directly under the Constitution without resort to any act of
Congress such as § 1983.11 Any doubt about whether Bivens extends
to amendments other than the fourth was removed by the Court in
Bruno because that was an action based on the fourteenth amend-
ment and the Court indicated there would be § 1331 jurisdiction
over the city in that case if the amount in controversy exceeded
$10,000.1' Since the Court in Bruno had already ruled out § 1983
43. 409 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. Id. at 720.
45. As Justice Harlan pointed out, plaintiff also attempted to state a claim under
§ 1983 with § 1343 jurisdiction, however, this route was not available because the defendants
were federal officials. 403 U.S. at 398 n.1.
46. 403 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
47. This conclusion does not make § 1983 superfluous because it may still be the only
basis of an action based solely on a federal statute, such as an action by a welfare recipient
to enforce rights under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. (1970).
48. The ruling in Bruno eliminates the need for a lengthy discussion on this issue; one
could certainly argue that there is absolutely nothing in the Constitution which makes the
fourth amendment different from others for cause of action purposes. See, e.g., Butler v. U.S.,
365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Ha. 1973).
1974]
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because the city was not a "person," the cause of action against the
city would have to arise under the Constitution. Justice Brennan in
his concurring opinion was more explicit regarding the cause of
action because he cited Bivens when stating that if the amount in
controversy exceeded $10,000, "then § 1331 jurisdiction is availa-
ble . . . and they are clearly entitled to relief."49 Thus, by combin-
ing Bivens and Bruno, the only possible conclusion is that a cause
of action can be stated directly under any of the amendments to the
United States Constitution. This extension of Bivens to amend-
ments other than the fourth had begun in the lower federal courts
even prior to Bruno,"' and has continued after Bruno.5
In addition to establishing that the Bivens rationale applies to
actions under any of the amendments to the Constitution, Bruno
conclusively establishes its application to actions against entities
not considered "persons" under § 1983. Bruno did, of course, in-
volve a municipality. Prior to Bruno at least two courts faced with
claims against municipalities based on Bivens dismissed the munic-
ipalities; however, neither explicitly held that a claim could not be
stated against a municipality directly under the Constitution. In
Payne v. Mertens, 52 an action against a city and several police offi-
cers seeking damages incident to a search of a home, the court
dismissed the city because the "[p]laintiffs have cited no authority
holding that an action for redress of Fourth Amendment rights can
be advanced against a municipality for the acts of its agents. ' 53 The
plaintiff in Washington v. Brantley5" claimed violations of fifth,
49. 412 U.S. at 516.
50. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
162 (1973) (fifth amendment); Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (fifth
amendment); Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment); Scheune-
mann v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 875, 876 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (fifth amendment). Another
court clearly suggested that if the plaintiff had chosen to state a Bivens type claim in his
ct.IucI, o ulsU-t . apply t& Lamltis UlUUI Job,! tLe dall! citu ulglhI! tilltil" LUI llL.5. Julnes
v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381, 1386-87 (D.R.I. 1973). In this case the plaintiffs chose
to proceed only under the Federal Tort Claims Act in an effort to recover damages resulting
from the death of a member of the United States Navy while in the custody of a security
guard.
51. Butler v. U.S., 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Ha. 1973) (first and fifth amendments); Amen
v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments); Noe v. County of Lake, Civil No. 73 H 157 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 1, 1973) (fifth, sixth,
eighth and fourteenth amendments).
52. 343 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
53. Id. at 1358.
54. 352 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
(Vol. 8
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sixth, seventh, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights by a police
officer and joined the city in an action for damages. After deciding
that the city was not a person for purposes of § 1983, the court,
while recognizing that Bivens applies to a violation of any constitu-
tionally protected interest"' and that Bivens is not limited to federal
officials, 6 concluded that "there can be no liability of a municiplity
for damages under a Bivens theory when in legal contemplation a
municipality stands in the place of the state." 7 Both Mertens and
Brantley were decided prior to Bruno. At least two post-Bruno
cases, Amen v. City of Dearborn"8 and Noe v. County of Lake,"9 have
applied the Bivens rationale to a city and county respectively. Amen
was an action to enjoin the clearance of certain residential areas of
Dearborn, Michigan on the ground that it constituted a taking of
property without due process of law. Without explanation, the court
indicated that even though the city was not a "person" under
§ 1983, "the court would still have jurisdiction over the City under
§ 1331."', In Noe the plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief
requiring the county to provide a constitutionally adequate public
defender system to represent indigents appearing in the county
criminal courts. The court refused to dismiss the county under Moor
and Bruno, explicitly holding that a cause of action had been stated
against the county pursuant to the rationale of Bivens.
Having established that a cause of action can be stated against
a county or municipality under any amendment to the United
States Constitution, the next problem is establishing jurisdiction in
the federal district courts. It is important to keep in mind that cause
of action and jurisdiction are two separate and distinct require-
55. However, in reaching this holding, the Court reasoned in such a manner
that it may be argued, notwithstanding the ratio decidendi of the case, that Bivens
recognizes a cause of action for damages for violation of any constitutionally pro-
tected interest.
Id. at 564.
56. However, this distinction [between federal officials and those acting under
color of state lawi is not persuasive since, for example, the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, (citations omitted),
and the Fourteenth Amendment is itself directly, facially applicable to the states.
Id. at 564.
57. Id. at 565.
58. 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
59. Civil No. 73 H 157 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 1, 1973).
60. 363 F. Supp. at 1270.
1974]
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ments, even though the two are often confused. Below we will look
at two available sources of jurisdiction over such suits.
JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
In view of Bivens and Bruno it is quite apparent that the federal
courts have § 1331 jurisdiction over causes of action stated directly
under the Constitution. That section reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States.
As noted in Bruno by both the majority' and Justice Brennan in
concurring,"2 the only possible question concerning § 1331(a) juris-
diction is whether or not the jurisdictional amount is met. In most
litigation in which the plaintiff will want to state a cause of action
directly under the Constitution, however, the matter at issue does
not easily lend itself to traditional concepts of monetary valuation.
For example, what is the monetary value of a particular constitu-
tional right such as right to counsel, freedom from unreasonable
searches or right to due process? Moreover, often the matter at issue
is worth more than $10,000 to the defendant but less than $10,000
to each individual plaintiff."' Because of the obvious importance of
the jurisdictional amount issue, we will briefly examine the ap-
proach courts have taken in some recent cases."4
The Supreme Court, in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red
Cab Co.,"5 established the rule for federal courts to follow in decid-
ing whether to dismiss a case for failure to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement.
61. 412 U.S. at 514.
62. Id. at 516.
63. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973).
64. Other articles have dealt more extensively with the question of jurisdictional
amount in injunctive and civil rights cases: See, e.g., Burke, What Price Jurisdiction?: The
Jurisdictional Amount in Injunctive Suits Against Federal Officials, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 215
(1973); Strausberg, The Jurisdictional Amount Requirement and Actions to Enjoin Depriva-
tion of Constitutional Rights by Federal Officials: The Lynching Effect, 17 How. L.J. 867
(1973); Comment, A Federal Question Question: Does Priceless Mean Worthless?, 14 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 268 (1969).
65. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
(Vol. 8
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The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in
cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law
gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff con-
trols if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."
In establishing this "legal certainty" rule the Supreme Court did
not, however, offer any guidelines to apply in evaluating certain
rights where precise measurement is difficult nor did it determine
whether one looks to the value to the plaintiff, cost to the defendant
or the underlying economic basis of the complaint. These questions
are particularly relevant in view of the Court's holdings in Snyder
v. Harris67 and Zahn v. International Paper Co.6s
Snyder v. Harris establishes that in class actions involving sep-
arate and distinct claims aggregation of claims is impermissible and
if' none of the named plaintiffs states a claim exceeding $10,000,
federal diversity jurisdiction cannot be established over the action.
Most recently, in Zahn v. International Paper Co., the Court held
that even though the named plaintiffs each state separate and dis-
tinct claims exceeding $10,000 in a diversity suit, a class action "is
maintainable only when every member of the class, whether an
appearing party or not, meets the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)."61 After these two cases, partic-
ularly Zahn, it will no longer be possible to name only plaintiffs who
can in good faith allege the $10,000 jurisdictional amount require-
ment and obtain relief for all members of the class regardless of
whether or not the members of the class can meet the jurisdictional
a mount requirement."'
Lower federal courts have been employing at least three differ-
ent approaches7' in civil rights type cases which tend to mitigate the
66. Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added),
67. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
68. - U.S.-, 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973).
69. 94 S.Ct. at 512 (dissenting opinion).
70. Even though Zahn involved a diversity action under § 1332, the Court makes it
quite clear that the test established would apply to § 1331 actions also. 94 S.Ct. at 512 n.ll.
71. This does not include the two exceptions to nonaggregation recognized by the Court
in Snyder: i.e., 1) "in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his
own claims against a single defendant and 2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite
1974]
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limitation imposed by Snyder.7" The first is illustrated by Cortright
v. Resor, 7:1 an action brought by a member of the Armed Forces
claiming his proposed transfer from New York to Texas had been
cancelled as the result of his engaging in activities protesting United
States involvement in Vietnam. A motion to dismiss for lack of the
requisite amount in controversy was denied by Judge Weinstein who
noted: "[Free] speech is almost by definition, worth more than
$10,000 so that the allegation of jurisdiction based upon § 1331
ought not to be subject to denial."74 This approach not only recog-
nizes that constitutional rights have monetary value,75 but nearly
assumes the right in question has value in excess of $10,000 if so
alleged by the plaintiff. Several courts have followed a middle
course agreeing that constitutional rights have monetary value and
allowing plaintiffs to allege and prove that the value of the particu-
lar right involved exceeds the required jurisdictional amount." In
courts following this course, plaintiffs alleging in excess of $10,000
would always survive a motion to dismiss which is certainly the
most crucial stage. Although the Cortright v. Resor presumption
that constitutional rights exceed $10,000 in value is the most favora-
ble to plaintiffs, the middle course does enable plaintiffs to survive
a motion to dismiss and appears to meet the "legal certainty" test.
Other cases have held that rights secured by federal statutory
programs, although incapable of exact valuation, were of sufficient
to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest." 394
U.S. at 335. Regarding the second exception, see also, Berman v. Narraganset Racing Ass'n,
414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969) and Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
72. As will become evident below, there is no reason to believe these approaches will
not survive Zahn also.
7:3. 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971); the Second
Circuit reversed on the merits but did not disturb the finding of § 1331 jurisdiction because
it held jurisdiction was also conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
74. 325 F. Supo. at 810. See alsn Mnrrmy v Vngb . 100 F. S-pp. CS8, C95 96 (D.R.!.
1969).
75. Some courts have refused to accept the argument that constitutional rights are
capable of monetary valuation; see, e.g., Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1398 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd without reaching § 1331 jurisdiction question, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
76. Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d 1115, 1116-17 (3d Cir. 1973); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478
F.2d 938, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 162 (1973); Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d
411, 421 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1059 (3d Cir. 1972); Klinkham-
mer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Minn. 1973); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp.
629, 637-38 (D. Utah 1973); Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238,
241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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value to confer jurisdiction. In Marquez v. Hardin" the plaintiffs
sought to enforce rights under the National School Lunch Act and
the court held that the value of the right in question, the right to
good health and full physical and mental development, exceeded
$10,000. 7h Similarly in Martinez v. Richardson,79 a case involving
rights under the federal medicare program,"0 the court decided the
jurisdictional amount issue by posing the following inquiry:
How can it be said with a degree of legal certainty that less
than $10,000 is at issue in this controversy what with the
astronomical costs of medical services and the particularly
high cost of home medical service, if indeed such service
can be obtained.'
The value of the right to good health was used as an alternate basis
for finding jurisdictional amount in Bass v. Rockefeller. 2 At issue
in Bass was welfare recipients' right to medical benefits, and the
court there stated: "Certainly the right to exist in society as rela-
tively healthy people is worth more than $10,000. ' '13
A second approach is to look to the value of the matter at stake
in the litigation or the value of what the plaintiffs seek to protect
in the litigation. For example, in National Ass'n for Community
Development v. Hodgson,4 the plaintiffs, four organizations repre-
senting unemployed persons, sought to enjoin the use of $200,000 of
Department of Labor funds by the defendants for lobbying pur-
poses. Admittedly, no plaintiff was entitled to any of the money and
there was no attempt to aggregate. Rather, plaintiffs argued that
the underlying economic basis for the suit was $200,000 and this was
the proper measure of the jurisdictional amount under § 1331.11 The
court agreed. This same principle was advanced very forcefully by
the court in Comprehensive Group Health Serv. Bd. of Dir. v. Tem-
77. 339 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
78. Id. at 1370. This case demonstrates the importance of characterizing the right in
the broadest terms possible; as the court correctly pointed out, the denial of lunches is much
more than a denial of several meals.
79. 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973).
80. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395, et seq. (1970).
81. 472 F.2d at 1125.
82. 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
83. Id. at 95:3 n.6.
84. 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
8.5. Id. at 1406-07.
19741
Bodensteiner: Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" for Dep
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
228 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pie U. : "
[Tihe law has long been that in injunction actions where
the amount in controversy is a jurisdictional issue, the
courts should look to the value of that which the plaintiffs
are trying to protect. See Glenwood Light & Power Co. v.
Mutual Light Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 36 S. Ct. 30,
60 L.Ed. 174 (1915); John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nav.
Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 779, 66 S. Ct. 530, 90 L.Ed. 1007 (1946).17
Looking to the underlying economic basis is particularly attractive
in injunctive actions seeking to limit or direct the use of funds
because the plaintiff very often will have either no claim to any of
the funds or a claim of less than $10,000.11
Finally, a few courts have accepted a cost-to-the-defendant
approach to the jurisdictional amount requirement. This is very
similar to the "underlying economic basis" theory and in some cases
the two clearly overlap. In Tatum v. Laird" the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia set out cost to the defendant as one way
of measuring jurisdictional amount. The plaintiffs in Tatum sought
an order enjoining the operation of the army's civilian intelligence
system and the prodution and destruction of all records pertaining
to the intelligence system. The district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint was reversed and the case remanded because the cost to the
army of complying with a decree might exceed $10,000. Although
Bass v. Rockefeller "' is better described as an example of a court
allowing aggregation based on a finding of a common and undivided
interest in a fund,"' the court there did point out that the cost to
86. :36:3 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
87. :36;3 F. Supp. at 1094. See also Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of
Heaiih. 367 F. Supp. 594, 598 (N.D. iii. 1 / ), where the court looked to the value of the
benefit to be conferred upon the plaintiff if he prevails.
88. See. e.g., North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 469 F.2d 1326, 1328 n.1
(3d Cir. 1972); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 807 (D.D.C.
1971).
89. 444 F.2d 947, 951 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd without reaching the question or
jurisdiction, sub nom. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
90. :331 F. Supp. 945 (S.DN.Y. 1971), remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot,
464 F.2d 1:300 (2d Cir. 1971).
91. The court found the situation to be "legally indistinguishable from those cases
heretofore discussed in which trust beneficiaries asserted a common and undivided interest
in the proper administration and preservation of a single fund." Id. at 952.
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the State if it could not implement a proposed cutback in Medicaid
would exceed $10,000.122 Looking to the viewpoint of the defendant
is certainly not universally accepted. But, as Charles Wright points
out, it would seem to be the desirable rule since the purpose of a
jurisdictional amount requirement is "to keep trivial cases away
from the court." ' If this is the purpose of the jurisdictional amount
requirement, certainly the obvious question is whether cases involv-
ing constitutional rights can ever be considered trivial? Cortright v.
Resor suggests that the answer is no. Use of this approach is ob-
viously most appropriate in injunctive actions where the benefit to
the plaintiff is less than the loss to the defendant if the relief is
granted.
While these approaches are enjoying some success in several
lower courts, the Supreme Court has not yet squarely faced the
issues raised by them. Certainly a plaintiff stating a claim under the
Constitution will want to allege § 1331 jurisdiction; however, espe-
cially in view of Zahn, 4 it would be wise to also allege jurisdiction
under § 1343 when suing defendants who have acted under color of
state law.
JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
Even though it is arguable under the theories and approaches
discussed in the preceding section that there is § 1331 jurisdiction
over most cases where a claim is stated directly under the Constitu-
tion, it is nevertheless extremely important that courts also recog-
nize the availability of § 1343(3) jurisdiction over such cases.95 Sec-
tion 1343(3) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any
person:
92. 331 F. Supp. at 952. Bass v. Rockefeller is discussed in Comprehensive Group
Health Serv. Bd. of Dir. v. Temple U., 363 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and was applied
as an alternate means of sustaining jurisdiction. Id. at 1095-96.
93. C. WRic.HT, FEDERAL COURTS § 34 at 119 (1970).
94. Even though Zahn involved § 1332, the majority made it clear that its rationale
would apply equally to § 1331 cases. 94 S.Ct. at 512 nl. The dissent questions this, 94 S.Ct.
at 513 n.5, but there is little reason to believe the result from this Court would be different
in a § 1331 case.
95. This is true because the jurisdictional amount arguments outlined above are not
necessarily universally accepted and it is not yet known exactly how the lower courts will
apply Zahn to class actions under § 1331.
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(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States .... 1s
On its face this section clearly gives the federal district courts juris-
diction of an action against a county or municipality alleging a
deprivation of a constitutional right and stating a claim directly
under the Constitution. Nothing could be more clear or unambi-
guous. Why, then, the statement in Bruno that "[tihe District
Court was therefore wrong in concluding that it had jurisdiction of
appellees' complaints under § 1343?" '  Possibly the Court was con-
fusing cause of action (§ 1983) and jurisdiction (§ 1343) or the
Court may have been implying that because of the common origin
of the two, § 1343 confers jurisdiction only where a cause of action
has been stated under § 1983.1s Whatever the reason for the Court's
statement, there appears to be no justification or authority for the
summary exclusion of § 1343 in such cases.
As the Supreme Court noted in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.," "[this court] has traced the origin of § 1983 and its juris-
dictional counterpart to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27."
What is now § 1983 was modeled after § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (emphasis added).
97. 412 U.S. at 513. Justice Brennan in concurring stated: "[nlevertheless, since the
defendants named in the complaints were the municipalities of Kenosha and Racine, jurisdic-
tion cannot be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343."
98. It has been suggested that § 1343(3) applies only to § 1983 actions because the
words "authorized by law" as used in § 1343 refer to § 1983.
An analysis of federal power under section 1343(3) must begin with the words 'author-
ized by jaw.' These words refer to section i983 and require that the piaintiff state a
cause of action within the scope of that section as a prerequisite to establishing
jurisdiction under section 1343(3).
Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 148 (1961). No
authority is given for the statement and indeed it would seem quite obvious that the Constitu-
tion is "law", especially in view of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, which refers to the
Constitution and laws of the United States as the "supreme Law of the Land." (emphasis
added).
The fact that a § 1983 action could be brought in a state court without relying on
§ 1343(3) for jurisdiction supports the argument that these two sections do not have to be
used together. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
99. 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972).
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/2
19741 SUITS AGAINST "NON-PERSONS"
Act,"" which provided criminal penalties for violations of § 1 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act."" It was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871112 and provided a civil remedy where the Act of
1866 provided criminal penalties. Both the substantive provision
(now § 1983) and the jurisdictional provision (now § 1343(3)) ap-
pear in § 1 of the 1871 Act. In 1875 the substantive portion of § 1
became separated from the jurisdictional portion and appeared as
§ 1979 of the Revised Statutes. "":5 The substantive provision "was
enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges or immunities
secured by federal law"" 4 as well as those secured by the Constitu-
tion. In 1934 it was codified as 8 U.S.C. § 43105 and later became 42
U.S.C. § 1983, retaining the exact language of Rev. Stat. § 1979.
100. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)).
101. Section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act olApril 1, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
102. Section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to
be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be
prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided
in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April,
eighteen hundred and sixty-six entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication"; and the
other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such
cases.
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
103. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875).
104. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543-44 n.7 (1972).
105. Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777.
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What is now § 1343(3) also has its origin in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act.""' Section 3 of the 1866 Act gave the district and circuit
courts jurisdiction over civil actions brought to enforce the provi-
sions of § 1.)7 Similar language then appeared in § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.""' In 1875 the Revised Statutes separated the
jurisdictional from the substantive and contained two separate ju-
risdictional provisions, § 563(12)"'1 concerning district courts, and
§ 629(16)1'" concerning circuit courts."' The two were not identi-
cal" ' and in 1911, when Congress abolished the original jurisdiction
of the circuit courts, the § 629(16) language survived as § 24(14) of
the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 42(14),":1 and finally became 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) in 1948. The language has remained substantially
the same since the adoption of § 629(16) in 1875.
This history of § 1983 and § 1343(3) makes it quite obvious
that even though both appeared together in § 1 of the Act of 1871
and remained together for a period of four years until the adoption
of the Revised Statutes in 1875, the concept of giving the federal
courts original jurisdiction over suits to redress deprivations of
rights identical to those secured by the fourteenth amendment (§ 1
of 1866 Act) predates the enactment of a statutorily created cause
of action by four years. Chronologically the steps were as follows:
(1) in 1866 Congress passed the predecessor of the fourteenth
106. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543-44 n.7 (1972). See also Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 476, 508 n.10 (1939).
107. Section 3 provides:
ITIhe district courts of the United States . . .shall have .. . cognizance
concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and
criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them
by the first section of this act ...
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the 1866 Act was the predecessor of
the fourteenth amendment with essentially the same provisions; the fourteenth amendment
was introduced the same vear hecat p. "of dnlht- -- t- the powe t ....ct th- !CgisIati'o,
and because the policy thereby evidenced might be reversed bya subsequent Congress.
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 476, 509 (1939).
10)8. See note 102, supra.
109. REV. STAT. § 563(12) (1875).
110. REV. STAT. § 629(16) (1875).
111. Until 1911 there were district and circuit courts, both with original jurisdiction.
112. Section 563(12) provided jurisdiction over suits to redress deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution or by "any law of the United States," while § 629(16) covered
rights secured by the Constitution or "any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the
United States."
113. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1092.
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amendment, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and in § 3 of that
Act gave district and circuit courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce
the provisions of § 1; (2) in 1868 the fourteenth amendment became
law; (3) in 1871 Congress passed the Act to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and in § 1 provided a cause of action and continued the
jurisdiction established in § 3 of the 1866 Act; and (4) in 1875 the
cause of action provision and the jurisdictional provision were sep-
arated. Clearly, then, in 1866 a civil action could have been brought
against a city or county pursuant to § 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
to enforce the provisions of § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. No-
where is there any indication that Congress, when it enacted the
jurisdictional provision of § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, intended
to narrow the jurisdictional provision of 1866. Thus it would seem
obvious that while § 1343(3) was intended to provide jurisdiction
over all § 1983 actions, it was never intended solely for § 1983 ac-
tions."' Certainly, at the very minimum, there is nothing in the
history of § 1343(3) that would prevent the courts from giving it the
meaning which appears clearly on its face-that it provides jurisdic-
tion over all actions to redress the deprivation of constitutional
rights where there is "state action." Just as the Court pointed out
in Lynch that "[nleither the words of § 1343(3) nor the legislative
history of that provision distinguish between personal and property
rights,""' so here, neither the words of § 1343(3) nor its legislative
history require a restriction to § 1983 actions.
As noted by the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Eastman,"'
§ 1343(3) has received little attention from the Supreme Court.
Usually it has been discussed in the context of questions concerning
§ 1983 and whether § 1343 provides jurisdiction for all § 1983
cases."17 The two cases which have discussed § 1343(3) most exten-
sively, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization"' and
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., '" did so in an attempt to resolve
114. There is some evidence that members of Congress, while considering § I of the
1871 Civil Rights Act, felt the cause of action provision was unnecessary because the provi-
sions of the fourteenth amendment were self-executing. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 198
(1961 ) (Harlan. J.. concurring).
115. 405 U.S. at 543.
116. 421 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
117. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
.398 U.S. 144 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
118. 307 U.S. 476 (1939).
119. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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the question of whether § 1343(3) provides jurisdiction when the
plaintiff is asserting property rights as opposed to personal rights.
Lynch laid this dispute to rest by giving § 1343(3) the "meaning
and sweep that [its] origins and [its] language dictate"'' " conclud-
ing that it provided jurisdiction over both types of cases-those
asserting property rights as well as those asserting personal rights.
This author is aware of no case in which the Supreme Court has
given a satisfactory explanation for the summary conclusion in
Bruno that § 1343(3) jurisdiction was not available because the
municipality was not within the ambit of § 1983.
Given the clear language of § 1343(3), its history dating back
to the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the absence of any authoritative
Supreme Court explanation to the contrary, the unwarranted con-
clusion in Bruno regarding § 1343(3) is unfortunate to say the least.
The opinion in Bruno makes it quite apparent that the Court did
not consider the § 1343(3) jurisdictional issue independent from the
§ 1983 cause of action issue. This is not surprising because of the
tendency to both confuse and combine consideration of jurisdiction
with cause of action. It would, however, be extremely unfortunate
to have an issue of such importance decided by default without any
real consideration of the merits. For this reason, plaintiffs stating a
cause of action directly under the Constitution would be well ad-
vised to assert § 1343(3) jurisdiction when the requisite state action
is present. Lynch is certainly precedent for interpreting § 1343(3)
consistent with its words"' and the broad purposes and concepts of
its origins.'12 Since the original grant of jurisdiction in 1866 covered
everything within the scope of § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the
statute embodying what two years later became the fourteenth
amendment, why now, contrary to the express language of
§ 1343(3), restrict jurisdiction to exclude suits seeking to redress
deprivations within the scope of the fourteenth amendment? By
-0---------~ - -- - -afktt ..l~A UO *iA X IAUL 5 UI
against municipalities and counties, the question will eventually
reach the Supreme Court in a posture that will require direct consid-
eration on the merits.
120. Id. at 549.
121. Id. at 543.
122. Id. at 545, 549.
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While conceding that Monroe v. Pape, Moor v. County of A la-
meda and City of Kenosha v. Bruno have made it more difficult to
state a claim against municipalities and counties by eliminating
§ 1983 as the basis for such a cause of action, there remains a very
definite alternate method of securing federal court jurisdiction over
such entities when the plaintiff is alleging deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. The first problem is to state a cause of action, absent
§ 1983. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Bruno supply the solution by establishing that
a cause of action can be stated directly under the United States
Constitution. Any question about whether the Bivens rationale was
limited to the fourth amendment and federal officials was implicitly
resolved by Bruno which involved the fourteenth amendment and
action under color of state law. Thus a cause of action against fed-
eral or state officials and entities can be stated directly under any
of the amendments to the United States Constitution.
After stating a cause of action, the next step is to establish
jurisdiction. Here there are two possibilities. The general federal
question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is always available if the
plaintiff can satisfy the jurisdictonal amount requirement. Even
though cases involving constitutional rights do not easily lend them-
selves to traditional concepts of monetary valuation, lower courts
have employed several different aproaches to the jurisdictional
amount problem. One approach is for the court to assume that
constitutional rights are by definition worth more than $10,000, or
in the alternative, allow the plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss
and prove that the value of the particular right involved exceeds
$10,000. A second approach looks to whether the value of the matter
at stake in the litigation exceeds $10,000; if it does, the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement is satisfied even though the plaintiff is
entitled to very little money or no money at all. Finally, some courts
have looked to the cost to the defendant of complying with the order
sought by the plaintiffs. If the cost to the defendant could exceed
$10,000, the court has jurisdiction. These approaches mitigate the
limtiations imposed on class actions by Snyder v. Harris and Zahn
v. International Paper Co.
The other possible source of jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
In Bruno the Court expressly found that § 1343(3) jurisdiction was
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not available because the municipality was not a person under
§ 1983. This unexplained conclusion, however, seems to be contrary
to the express language and purpose of § 1343(3). Although § 1983
and § 1343(3) are usually considered together, the fact remains that
they are separate provisions with different functions. Federal court
jurisdiction over civil rights actions dates back to § 3 of the 1866
Civil Rights Act. Section 1983 also has its origins in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, but did not appear as the civil counterpart of the 1866
Act until the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Thus the history of the two
sections, 1983 and 1343(3), is not identical and there is nothing in
the history of either which mandates the conclusion that § 1343(3)
is limited to § 1983 actions. Rather, under Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., § 1343(3) should be interpreted consistent with its
words and the broad purposes and concepts of its origins. Section
1343(3) jurisdiction would, of course, impose no jurisdictional
amount requirement and completely avoid the restrictions of
Snyder v. Harris and Zahn v. International Paper Co. on class ac-
tions.
Federal court plaintiffs should, therefore, continue to name
municipalities and counties as defendants in suits to redress depri-
vations of constitutional rights. Only by carefully pleading a cause
of action directly under the Constitution and asserting § 1331 and
§ 1343(3) jurisdiction can it be assured that the reprieve provided
municipalities and counties by Monroe, Moor and Bruno will be
short-lived.
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